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1999-05-01
The Economics of Audit Quality: Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and Non-Audit Services - de Benito Arrunada (Author)
Details The Economics of Audit Quality: Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and Non-Audit Services
Le paragraphe ci-dessous sont affichées les données spécifiques relatives aux The Economics of Audit Quality: Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and Non-Audit Services
Le Titre Du Fichier | The Economics of Audit Quality: Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and Non-Audit Services |
Date de Parution | 1999-05-01 |
Traducteur | Ayonitemi Llywelyn |
Numéro de Pages | 590 Pages |
Taille du fichier | 37.10 MB |
Langue du Livre | Français & Anglais |
Éditeur | Riverhead Books |
ISBN-10 | 1595533431-NCO |
Type de Livre | PDF AMZ ePub CCF TXT |
de (Auteur) | Benito Arrunada |
Digital ISBN | 471-4471199443-TNL |
Nom de Fichier | The-Economics-of-Audit-Quality-Private-Incentives-and-the-Regulation-of-Audit-and-Non-Audit-Services.pdf |
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Noté 005 Achetez The Economics of Audit Quality Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and NonAudit Services de Benito Arruñada ISBN 9781441950826 sur des millions de livres livrés chez vous en 1 jour
Noté 005 Achetez The Economics of Audit Quality Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and NonAudit Services de Benito Arrunada ISBN 9780792384731 sur des millions de livres livrés chez vous en 1 jour
The Economics of Audit Quality Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and NonAudit Services
The Economics of Audit Quality Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and NonAudit Services
Regulation should thus aim to enable the partiesaudit firms selfregulatory bodies and audit clientsto discover through competitive market interaction both the most efficient mix of services and the corresponding quality safeguards adjusting for the costs and benefits of each possibility
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