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Télécharger The Economics of Audit Quality: Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and Non-Audit Services Livre PDF Gratuit

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1999-05-01
The Economics of Audit Quality: Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and Non-Audit Services - de Benito Arrunada (Author)

Details The Economics of Audit Quality: Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and Non-Audit Services

Le paragraphe ci-dessous sont affichées les données spécifiques relatives aux The Economics of Audit Quality: Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and Non-Audit Services

Le Titre Du FichierThe Economics of Audit Quality: Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and Non-Audit Services
Date de Parution1999-05-01
TraducteurAyonitemi Llywelyn
Numéro de Pages590 Pages
Taille du fichier37.10 MB
Langue du LivreFrançais & Anglais
ÉditeurRiverhead Books
ISBN-101595533431-NCO
Type de LivrePDF AMZ ePub CCF TXT
de (Auteur)Benito Arrunada
Digital ISBN471-4471199443-TNL
Nom de FichierThe-Economics-of-Audit-Quality-Private-Incentives-and-the-Regulation-of-Audit-and-Non-Audit-Services.pdf

Télécharger The Economics of Audit Quality: Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and Non-Audit Services Livre PDF Gratuit

Noté 005 Achetez The Economics of Audit Quality Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and NonAudit Services de Benito Arruñada ISBN 9781441950826 sur des millions de livres livrés chez vous en 1 jour

Noté 005 Achetez The Economics of Audit Quality Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and NonAudit Services de Benito Arrunada ISBN 9780792384731 sur des millions de livres livrés chez vous en 1 jour

The Economics of Audit Quality Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and NonAudit Services

The Economics of Audit Quality Private Incentives and the Regulation of Audit and NonAudit Services

Regulation should thus aim to enable the partiesaudit firms selfregulatory bodies and audit clientsto discover through competitive market interaction both the most efficient mix of services and the corresponding quality safeguards adjusting for the costs and benefits of each possibility

Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments with Matthieu Glachant and Gabrielle Moineville American Economic Journal Microeconomics 91 242274 2017 penultimate WPdoi101257mic20150119 Rémunération des dirigeants et risque de fraude dentreprise with Thierry Lafay and Constance Monnier

The Economics Of Information Market Failure The Economics Of Information Market Failure


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